

School of **Global Affairs** and **Public Policy**

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Inflation Targeting and Anchoring of Inflation Expectations – Trust Me

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Inflation Targeting: Motivation and Timeline

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June 2005

The CBE declared its intention to put a formal IT framework in place upon fulfilling its prerequisites.

May 2017- December 2022

In May 2017, the CBE introduced it's first target band. Up till today the CBE has revised this target 4 times to gradually align inflation with its medium-term target.



The CBE officially de-valued the EGP value against the USD and confirmed its intention to adopt an IT framework.

March 2024

The CBE de-valued the pound value again and reconfirmed its intention to adopt an IT strategy.



https://www.cbe.org.eg/en/monetary-policy/inflation-target









Address high & persistent historical inflation rates.

Enhance the effectiveness of the monetary policy transmission mechanisms to the real economy.

Ensure the flexibility of exchange rate regime.

Ensure that long-term inflation expectations are firmly-anchored.

IT Prerequisites and Expectations Anchoring



The success of IT strategy requires satisfying certain prerequisites:

Economic. Institutional. and Technical.

In this paper we argue that if long-term inflation expectation is not firmly anchored, it might limit the CBE's capacity to fulfill these prerequisites.

Inflation Persistence

If inflation expectations are de-anchored, it can amplify inflation persistence, causing price pressures to endure longer and causing inflation deviate from target.

Transmission Mechanisms

Unanchored expectations reduce interest rate effectiveness as people and businesses may not adjust their behavior to rate changes, limiting CBE's control over inflation.

Exchange Rate and Fear of Floating

Unanchored expectations can destabilize foreign ER markets by increasing volatility, as market participants lose confidence in the CBE's ability to reach target and maintain currency stability. Persistent ER interventions may cast doubts on the CBE's commitment to meeting its target.

Fiscal Dominance

Unanchored expectations can exacerbate FD by making the CBE more hesitant to raise interest rates, as doing so would increase public debt servicing costs, further limiting its ability to control inflation.

De Facto Independence

Expectations de-anchoring can worsen de facto independence by undermining the CBE's credibility, making it harder to act independently to control inflation despite de jure independence.

Evaluation Measures of Expectations Anchoring



The extent to which inflation expectations remain anchored, they are aligned with the CBE's target, or turn de-anchored, they have deviated from the target, depends on the efficacy of the CBE in managing and guiding the expectations of market participants regarding future inflation.



Empirical literature uses two primary approaches to evaluate the degree of inflation expectations' anchoring or de-anchoring: survey-based measures and market-based measures.

Survey-Based Approach

Experts or households are regularly surveyed 80 about their expectations on future inflation.

> Provides a direct method for assessing the impact of shocks on long-term expectations.

Inflation expectations are collected at a low frequency, monthly at best.

Market-Based Approach



Using market data from inflation-indexed bonds or inflation swaps to deduce inflation expectations of the market participants.



Provides a method for assessing the impact of economic shocks on long-term expectations.



Inflation expectations may be distorted by liquidity and risk premia.

Degree of Inflation Expectations Anchoring: Data & Tests

long-term inflation

expectations.

how much they rely

on the historical

record of inflation.



such as exchange

rates, interest rates,

and budget balance.

Tests





I) Are Inflation Expectations Backward-Looking?

When firmly anchored, inflation expectations, particularly those of the long term, should not respond to the short-term developments of inflation rate. Instead, expectations should be anchored to the announced long-term target.

$$\pi^{e}_{t,t+n} = \alpha + \beta \pi_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \ldots$$

The model estimation results show that the parameter β , which determines the degree of expectations backward-lookingness, is statistically significant across all time horizons. The longer-term expectations are, however, relatively more well-anchored.

Assessing the anchoring status of inflation expectations over such an extended period may pose a challenge due to potential variations in the expectation formation process influenced by changes in the macroeconomic policy setup.

Therefore, Eq. 1 will be re-estimated using rolling regressions to evaluate model parameters stability, especially β , over time. Put differently, estimate whether the degree of inflation expectations backward-lookingness vary overtime.





Estimating the Degree of Inflation Expectations Backward-Lookingness Overtime

Short-term expectations are generally less-anchored as compared to medium- and long-term expectations. See for example the response of 1-year, 2-year, and 3-year ahead expectation around the period of GFC as compared to the response of 4-year, and 5-year ahead.

Aside from periods of major disruption, such as the political instability in early 2011, currency devaluation at the end of 2016, and the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, inflation expectations across different horizons are typically well anchored.

A clear de-anchoring wave of inflation expectations is observable around the period of currency devaluation at the end of 2016. This can be observed in two dimension: **relative magnitude of the estimated parameter and the wider confidence bands around estimates**.



II) Are Long-Term Expectations Responsive to Short-Term Expectations?

If well anchored, long-term expectations should not co-move with their short-term counterparts. If people and firms believe that the CBE will take necessary measures to bring inflation back to target upon deviation, they will unlikely transfer their uncertainties to long-term expectations.

$$\pi^e_{t,t+n} = \alpha + \beta \pi^e_{t,t+m} + \varepsilon_t$$
 with m < n.

Assessing the anchoring status of inflation expectations over an extended period may pose a challenge due to potential variations in the expectation formation process influenced by changes in the macroeconomic policy environment.

Eq. 2, therefore, will be re-estimated using rolling regressions to evaluate model parameter stability, especially β , over time. Put differently, estimate whether the degree of cross-inflationexpectations spillovers vary overtime.

..... Eq. 2

Estimating the Degree of Cross-Expectations Spillovers Overtime

01

The estimated de-anchoring effects of cross-expectations spillovers are much modest in size as compared to those of inflation backwardlookingness.

02

Long-term expectations respond less to short-term expectations compared to medium-term expectations, which is quite typical.

03

Among the key de-anchoring events, currency devaluation in 2016 appears to have had a significant impact on the state of inflation expectations anchoring in terms of **magnitude and uncertainty**.

III) Are Inflation Expectations Responsive to Forecast Revisions?

When economic agents anchor their long-term inflation expectations to the target, they shield themselves from the noise of short-term macroeconomic news or surprises.

The empirical literature employs news regressions to examine this hypothesis, using data and diverse β parameters to regress changes in monthly 5-year ahead inflation expectations on revisions of expert forecasts covering a wide range of macroeconomic indicators.

This set includes indicators such as the average lending rate (ALR), capital account balance (CAB), imports of goods (IoG), exports of goods (EoG), average exchange rate of USD against EGP (AER), government budget balance (GBB), external debt balance (EDB), GDP growth (RGG), unemployment rate (UER), industrial production growth (IPG), and agricultural production growth (APG).

Table2: Least Squares Regressions with Breakpoints of: $\Delta \pi^{e}_{t,t+5} = \alpha + \beta \Delta F R^{e}_{t,t+1} + \varepsilon_{t}$

	Full Sample: 288 Obs.	Episode I:	Episode II:	Episode III:
Estimated Coefficient		155 Obs.	43 Obs.	45 Obs.
	00M01:23M12	00M01:12M11	12M12:16M06	16M07:20M03
â	0.03***	0.03*	-0.07	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.06)
$\widehat{\beta_{dALR}}$	0.01	0.04	0.44*	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.22)	(0.06)
$\widehat{\beta_{dCAB}}$	-0.03**	0.00	0.14	-0.15
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.22)	(0.08)
$\widehat{\beta_{dIoG}}$	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
$\widehat{eta_{dEoG}}$	-0.00	-0.02	-0.04	-0.05
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.03)
$\widehat{\beta_{dAER}}$	-0.03	-0.15	2.63***	-0.16
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.57)	(0.15)
$\widehat{\beta_{dGBB}}$	-0.00	-0.03	-0.17	-0.07
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.15)	(0.09)
$\widehat{\beta_{dEDB}}$	-0.03*	-0.00	-0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.04)
$\widehat{\beta_{dRGG}}$	-0.10	-0.01	-0.00	-0.86**
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.23)	(0.34)
β_{dUER}	-0.00	-0.03	-0.08	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)
$\bar{\beta}_{dIPG}$	0.03	-0.03	0.08	-0.06
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)
β_{dAPG}	0.05	0.26	-0.24	4.35***
	(0.10)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(1.09)
Adjusted	0.02	0.02	0.66	0.62
R-Squared				
Prob(F-statistic)	0.09	0.22	0.00	0.00

Episode IV:
45 Obs.
20M04:23M12
0.07
(0.05)
0.03
(0.03)
-0.04
(0.06)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.02
(0.02)
0.04
(0.03)
0.13
(0.10)
-0.01
(0.02)
-0.04
(0.05)
0.08
(0.06)
0.03
(0.03)
-0.07
(0.06)
0.20
0.00
0.06

Estimating the Responsiveness of Inflation Expectations to Forecast Revisions: Initial Remarks

Estimating Eq. 3 using linear least squares without accounting for structural breaks would have led to the belief that long-term inflation expectations were fully anchored during the period from 2000 to 2023.

Using breakpoint regression, the data identifies three significant anchoring breakpoints, coinciding with notable economic events and policy changes in December 2012, July 2016, and April 2020. Hence, rather than a continuous period of anchoring or de-anchoring, breakpoint regressions propose that inflation expectations in Egypt went through episodes of anchoring, deanchoring, and re-anchoring.

Estimating the Responsiveness of Inflation Expectations to Forecast Revisions: The Complete Story

Episode I (January 2000 to November 2012):

During the period preceding the political instability around 2011– 2013, inflation expectations were highly anchored, with nearly all estimates on forecast revision indicators being statistically insignificant.

Episode II (December 2012 to June 2016):

Due to the political instability costs from 2011 to 2013 and the resulting economic burden, inflation expectations turned deanchored in the second episode, just before the currency devaluation.

The de-anchoring catalyst of that period was known: the highly significant exchange rate surprises!

During that period, a 1% increase (depreciation) in the rate of growth in the bilateral exchange rate of the EGP against the USD would result in a 2.63% jump in the growth rate of five-year ahead inflation expectations, an absolute de-anchoring.

Episode III (July 2016 to March 2020):

In the third episode, de-anchoring lessened, evident in the decreased Rsquared from the previous period. However, expectations persisted in a deanchored state, as confirmed by the pvalue of the joint significance test.

Remarkably, the factors driving the deanchoring of inflation expectations have shifted.

With the onset of COVID-19, there has been a noticeable increase in sensitivity to real variables like GDP growth, agricultural production growth, and imports growth.

Future Re-anchoring Episodes: The Role of Exchange Rate

De-Anchoring

The exchange rate played a significant role in pushing long-term inflation expectations into a state of de-anchoring, particularly during the economic fallout from political and social instability between 2011 and 2013.

Re-Anchoring

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3

Evidence supports successful partial re-anchoring following the exchange rate devaluation by the end of 2016, emphasizing the crucial role of the exchange rate flexibility in this process.

Coordination and Stability

Coordinated interventions in the foreign exchange market, especially during large currency shocks, are essential to reduce exchange rate volatility and anchor expectations within the newly adopted IT framework.

Future Re-anchoring Episodes: Monetary Policy Effectiveness

Effectiveness

Strengthening the effectiveness of the interest rate as a monetary transmission channel is vital for expectations anchoring within the to-be-adopted IT framework.

Financial Inclusion

Continued advancement of financial inclusion is a key priority, considering the significant percentage of unbanked adults in Egypt as of 2022.

Informal Sector

Addressing the substantial presence of the informal sector is crucial to enhancing the effectiveness of the interest rate channel within the MTM.

Future Re-anchoring Episodes: Risks of Fiscal Dominance

2

Persistent Inflationary Pressures

1

Fiscal dominance can lead to persistent inflationary pressures that drive inflation expectations away from the announced target, posing a threat to the credibility of the IT framework.

Underdeveloped Capital Markets

Underdeveloped capital markets can limit the effectiveness of adjusting interest rates as a key instrument for monetary policy, impacting the central bank's influence on macroeconomic conditions.

Future Re-anchoring Episodes: Communication Strategy

Implement adaptive learning strategy to understand and respond to economic conditions more effectively, a crucial element in gradually reducing the persistence of inflation rates.

Flexible Inflation Target:

Adopt a flexible inflation target that can adjust to changing circumstances, enhancing the central bank's ability to re-anchor long-term inflation expectations.

Implement an inclusive communication approach to enhance the transparency and framework of policy insights.

Transparency Framework:

Improve the transparency framework to project an independent, credible, and accountable monetary authority.

Thank You!